Zero Trust Networks. Building Secure Systems in Untrusted Networks

Spis treści książki

• Preface
  • Who Should Read This Book
  • Why We Wrote This Book
  • Zero Trust Networks Today
  • Navigating This Book
  • Conventions Used in This Book
  • OReilly Safari
  • How to Contact Us
  • Acknowledgments
• 1. Zero Trust Fundamentals
  • What Is a Zero Trust Network?
    • Introducing the Zero Trust Control Plane
  • Evolution of the Perimeter Model
    • Managing the Global IP Address Space
    • Birth of Private IP Address Space
    • Private Networks Connect to Public Networks
    • Birth of NAT
    • The Contemporary Perimeter Model
  • Evolution of the Threat Landscape
  • Perimeter Shortcomings
  • Where the Trust Lies
  • Automation as an Enabler
  • Perimeter Versus Zero Trust
  • Applied in the Cloud
  • Summary
• 2. Managing Trust
  • Threat Models
    • Common Threat Models
    • Zero Trusts Threat Model
  • Strong Authentication
  • Authenticating Trust
    • What Is a Certificate Authority?
    • Importance of PKI in Zero Trust
    • Private Versus Public PKI
    • Public PKI Strictly Better Than None
  • Least Privilege
  • Variable Trust
  • Control Plane Versus Data Plane
  • Summary
• 3. Network Agents
  • What Is an Agent?
    • Agent Volatility
    • Whats in an Agent?
  • How Is an Agent Used?
    • Not for Authentication
  • How to Expose an Agent?
  • No Standard Exists
    • Rigidity and Fluidity, at the Same Time
    • Standardization Desirable
    • In the Meantime?
  • Summary
• 4. Making Authorization Decisions
  • Authorization Architecture
  • Enforcement
  • Policy Engine
    • Policy Storage
    • What Makes Good Policy?
    • Who Defines Policy?
  • Trust Engine
    • What Entities Are Scored?
    • Exposing Scores Considered Risky
  • Data Stores
  • Summary
• 5. Trusting Devices
  • Bootstrapping Trust
    • Generating and Securing Identity
    • Identity Security in Static and Dynamic Systems
  • Authenticating Devices with the Control Plane
    • X.509
      • Certificate chains and certification authorities
      • Device identity and X.509
      • Public and private components
      • Private key storage
      • X.509 for device authentication
    • TPMs
      • Encrypting data using a TPM
        • Intermediary keys and passphrases
      • Platform configuration registers
      • Remote attestation
      • TPMs for device authentication
    • Hardware-Based Zero Trust Supplicant?
  • Inventory Management
    • Knowing What to Expect
    • Secure Introduction
      • What Makes a Good Secure Introduction System?
  • Renewing Device Trust
    • Local Measurement
    • Remote Measurement
  • Software Configuration Management
    • CM-Based Inventory
      • Searchable inventory
    • Secure Source of Truth
  • Using Device Data for User Authorization
  • Trust Signals
    • Time Since Image
    • Historical Access
    • Location
    • Network Communication Patterns
  • Summary
• 6. Trusting Users
  • Identity Authority
  • Bootstrapping Identity in a Private System
    • Government-Issued Identification
    • Nothing Beats Meatspace
    • Expectations and Stars
  • Storing Identity
    • User Directories
    • Directory Maintenance
  • When to Authenticate Identity
    • Authenticating for Trust
    • Trust as the Authentication Driver
    • The Use of Multiple Channels
    • Caching Identity and Trust
  • How to Authenticate Identity
    • Something You Know: Passwords
    • Something You Have: TOTP
    • Something You Have: Certificates
    • Something You Have: Security Tokens
    • Something You Are: Biometrics
    • Out-of-Band Authentication
    • Single Sign On
    • Moving Toward a Local Auth Solution
  • Authenticating and Authorizing a Group
    • Shamirs Secret Sharing
    • Red October
  • See Something, Say Something
  • Trust Signals
  • Summary
• 7. Trusting Applications
  • Understanding the Application Pipeline
  • Trusting Source
    • Securing the Repository
    • Authentic Code and the Audit Trail
    • Code Reviews
  • Trusting Builds
    • The Risk
    • Trusted Input, Trusted Output
    • Reproducible Builds
    • Decoupling Release and Artifact Versions
  • Trusting Distribution
    • Promoting an Artifact
    • Distribution Security
    • Integrity and Authenticity
    • Trusting a Distribution Network
  • Humans in the Loop
  • Trusting an Instance
    • Upgrade-Only Policy
    • Authorized Instances
  • Runtime Security
    • Secure Coding Practices
    • Isolation
    • Active Monitoring
  • Summary
• 8. Trusting the Traffic
  • Encryption Versus Authentication
    • Authenticity Without Encryption?
  • Bootstrapping Trust: The First Packet
    • fwknop
      • Short-lived exceptions
      • SPA payload
      • Payload encryption
      • HMAC
  • A Brief Introduction to Network Models
    • Network Layers, Visually
    • OSI Network Model
      • Layer 1Physical Layer
      • Layer 2Data Link Layer
      • Layer 3Network Layer
      • Layer 4Transport Layer
      • Layer 5Session Layer
      • Layer 6Presentation Layer
      • Layer 7Application Layer
    • TCP/IP Network Model
  • Where Should Zero Trust Be in the Network Model?
    • Client and Server Split
      • Network support issues
      • Device support issues
      • Application support issues
      • A pragmatic approach
  • The Protocols
    • IKE/IPsec
      • IKE and IPsec
      • Authentication credentials
      • IKE SA_INIT and AUTH
      • Cipher suite selection
      • IPsec security associations
      • IPsec tunnel mode versus transport mode
      • IKE/IPsec for device authentication
    • Mutually Authenticated TLS
      • Cipher suite negotiation and selection
        • Who gets to say
        • Key exchange
        • Perfect Forward Secrecy
        • Mind Your Curves
        • Authentication
      • Separation of duty
      • Bulk encryption
      • Message authenticity
      • Mutually authenticated TLS for device authentication
  • Filtering
    • Host Filtering
    • Bookended Filtering
    • Intermediary Filtering
  • Summary
• 9. Realizing a Zero Trust Network
  • Choosing Scope
    • Whats Actually Required?
      • All network flows MUST be authenticated before being processed
      • All network flows SHOULD be encrypted before being transmitted
      • Authentication and encryption MUST be performed by the application-layer endpoints
      • All network flows MUST be enumerated so that access can be enforced by the system
      • The strongest authentication and encryption suites available SHOULD be used within the network
      • Authentication SHOULD NOT rely on public PKI providersprivate PKI systems should be used instead
      • Devices SHOULD be regularly scanned, patched, and rotated
  • Building a System Diagram
  • Understanding Your Flows
  • Controller-Less Architecture
    • Cheating with Configuration Management
    • Application Authentication and Authorization
    • Authenticating Load Balancers and Proxies
    • Relationship-Oriented Policy
    • Policy Distribution
  • Defining and Installing Policy
  • Zero Trust Proxies
  • Client-Side Versus Server-Side Migrations
  • Case Studies
  • Case Study: Google BeyondCorp
    • The Major Components of BeyondCorp
      • Securely identifying the device
        • Device inventory database
        • Device identity
      • Securely identifying the user
      • Externalizing applications and workflows: The access proxy
      • Implementing inventory-based access control
    • Leveraging and Extending the GFE
      • User authentication
      • Authorization
      • Mutual authentication between the proxy and the backend
    • Challenges with Multiplatform Authentication
      • Desktops and laptops
      • Mobile devices
    • Migrating to BeyondCorp
      • Deploying an unprivileged network
      • Workflow qualification
      • Cutting back on VPN usage
      • Traffic analysis pipeline
      • Unprivileged network simulation
      • Migration strategy
      • Exemption handling
    • Lessons Learned
      • Communication
      • Engineers need support
      • Data quality and correlation
      • Sparse data sets
    • Conclusion
  • Case Study: PagerDutys Cloud Agnostic Network
    • Configuration Management as an Automation Platform
    • Dynamically Calculated Local Firewalls
    • Distributed Traffic Encryption
    • Decentralized User Management
    • Rollout
    • Value of a Provider-Agnostic System
  • Summary
• 10. The Adversarial View
  • Identity Theft
  • Distributed Denial of Service
  • Endpoint Enumeration
  • Untrusted Computing Platform
  • Social Engineering
  • Physical Coercion
  • Invalidation
  • Control Plane Security
  • Summary
• Index

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