Hacking Kubernetes

Spis treści ebooka

• Preface
  • About You
  • About Us
  • How To Use This Book
  • Conventions Used in This Book
  • Using Code Examples
  • OReilly Online Learning
  • How to Contact Us
  • Acknowledgments
• 1. Introduction
  • Setting the Scene
  • Starting to Threat Model
    • Threat Actors
    • Your First Threat Model
  • Attack Trees
  • Example Attack Trees
  • Prior Art
  • Conclusion
• 2. Pod-Level Resources
  • Defaults
  • Threat Model
  • Anatomy of the Attack
    • Remote Code Execution
    • Network Attack Surface
  • Kubernetes Workloads: Apps in a Pod
  • Whats a Pod?
  • Understanding Containers
    • Sharing Network and Storage
    • Whats the Worst That Could Happen?
    • Container Breakout
  • Pod Configuration and Threats
    • Pod Header
    • Reverse Uptime
    • Labels
    • Managed Fields
    • Pod Namespace and Owner
    • Environment Variables
    • Container Images
    • Pod Probes
    • CPU and Memory Limits and Requests
    • DNS
    • Pod securityContext
    • Pod Service Accounts
    • Scheduler and Tolerations
    • Pod Volume Definitions
    • Pod Network Status
  • Using the securityContext Correctly
    • Enhancing the securityContext with Kubesec
    • Hardened securityContext
      • containers[] .securityContext .privileged
      • .spec .hostPID
      • .spec .hostNetwork
      • .spec .hostAliases
      • .spec .hostIPC
      • containers[] .securityContext .runAsNonRoot
      • containers[] .securityContext .runAsUser > 10000
      • containers[] .securityContext .readOnlyRootFilesystem
      • containers[] .securityContext .capabilities .drop | index(ALL)
      • containers[] .securityContext .capabilities .add | index(SYS_ADMIN)
      • containers[] .resources .limits .cpu, .memory
      • containers[] .resources .requests .cpu, .memory
      • .spec .volumes[] .hostPath .path
  • Into the Eye of the Storm
  • Conclusion
• 3. Container Runtime Isolation
  • Defaults
  • Threat Model
  • Containers, Virtual Machines, and Sandboxes
    • How Virtual Machines Work
    • Benefits of Virtualization
    • Whats Wrong with Containers?
    • User Namespace Vulnerabilities
  • Sandboxing
    • gVisor
    • Firecracker
    • Kata Containers
    • rust-vmm
  • Risks of Sandboxing
  • Kubernetes Runtime Class
  • Conclusion
• 4. Applications and Supply Chain
  • Defaults
  • Threat Model
  • The Supply Chain
    • Software
    • Scanning for CVEs
    • Ingesting Open Source Software
    • Which Producers Do We Trust?
  • CNCF Security Technical Advisory Group
    • Architecting Containerized Apps for Resilience
    • Detecting Trojans
  • Captain Hashjack Attacks a Supply Chain
    • Post-Compromise Persistence
    • Risks to Your Systems
  • Container Image Build Supply Chains
    • Software Factories
    • Blessed Image Factory
    • Base Images
  • The State of Your Container Supply Chains
    • Third-Party Code Risk
    • Software Bills of Materials
    • Human Identity and GPG
  • Signing Builds and Metadata
    • Notary v1
    • sigstore
    • in-toto and TUF
    • GCP Binary Authorization
    • Grafeas
  • Infrastructure Supply Chain
    • Operator Privileges
    • Attacking Higher Up the Supply Chain
  • Types of Supply Chain Attack
    • Open Source Ingestion
    • Application Vulnerability Throughout the SDLC
  • Defending Against SUNBURST
  • Conclusion
• 5. Networking
  • Defaults
    • Intra-Pod Networking
    • Inter-Pod Traffic
    • Pod-to-Worker Node Traffic
    • Cluster-External Traffic
    • The State of the ARP
    • No securityContext
    • No Workload Identity
    • No Encryption on the Wire
  • Threat Model
  • Traffic Flow Control
    • The Setup
    • Network Policies to the Rescue!
  • Service Meshes
    • Concept
    • Options and Uptake
    • Case Study: mTLS with Linkerd
  • eBPF
    • Concept
    • Options and Uptake
    • Case Study: Attaching a Probe to a Go Program
  • Conclusion
• 6. Storage
  • Defaults
  • Threat Model
  • Volumes and Datastores
    • Everything Is a Stream of Bytes
    • Whats a Filesystem?
    • Container Volumes and Mounts
    • OverlayFS
    • tmpfs
    • Volume Mount Breaks Container Isolation
    • The /proc/self/exe CVE
  • Sensitive Information at Rest
    • Mounted Secrets
    • Attacking Mounted Secrets
  • Storage Concepts
    • Container Storage Interface
    • Projected Volumes
    • Attacking Volumes
    • The Dangers of Host Mounts
    • Other Secrets and Exfiltraing from Datastores
  • Conclusion
• 7. Hard Multitenancy
  • Defaults
  • Threat Model
  • Namespaced Resources
    • Node Pools
    • Node Taints
  • Soft Multitenancy
  • Hard Multitenancy
    • Hostile Tenants
    • Sandboxing and Policy
    • Public Cloud Multitenancy
  • Control Plane
    • API Server and etcd
    • Scheduler and Controller Manager
  • Data Plane
  • Cluster Isolation Architecture
  • Cluster Support Services and Tooling Environments
  • Security Monitoring and Visibility
  • Conclusion
• 8. Policy
  • Types of Policies
  • Defaults
    • Network Traffic
    • Limiting Resource Allocations
    • Resource Quotas
    • Runtime Policies
    • Access Control Policies
  • Threat Model
  • Common Expectations
    • Breakglass Scenario
    • Auditing
  • Authentication and Authorization
    • Human Users
    • Workload Identity
      • Service accounts
      • Cryptographically strong identities
  • Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
    • RBAC Recap
    • A Simple RBAC Example
    • Authoring RBAC
    • Analyzing and Visualizing RBAC
    • RBAC-Related Attacks
  • Generic Policy Engines
    • Open Policy Agent
      • Using OPA directly
      • Gatekeeper
    • Kyverno
    • Other Policy Offerings
  • Conclusion
• 9. Intrusion Detection
  • Defaults
  • Threat Model
  • Traditional IDS
  • eBPF-Based IDS
    • Kubernetes and Container Intrusion Detection
    • Falco
  • Machine Learning Approaches to IDS
  • Container Forensics
  • Honeypots
  • Auditing
  • Detection Evasion
  • Security Operations Centers
  • Conclusion
• 10. Organizations
  • The Weakest Link
  • Cloud Providers
    • Shared Responsibility
    • Account Hygiene
    • Grouping People and Resources
    • Other Considerations
      • Dealing with root certificate authorities
      • Avoid leaking credentials
  • On-Premises Environments
  • Common Considerations
    • Threat Model Explosion
    • How SLOs Can Put Additional Pressure on You
    • Social Engineering
    • Privacy and Regulatory Concerns
  • Conclusion
• A. A Pod-Level Attack
  • Filesystem
  • tmpfs
  • Host Mounts
    • Hostile Containers
    • Runtime
• B. Resources
  • General
    • References
    • Books
  • Further Reading by Chapter
    • Intro
    • Pods
    • Supply Chains
    • Networking
    • Policy
  • Notable CVEs
• Index

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