Chaos Engineering. System Resiliency in Practice Casey Rosenthal, Nora Jones

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Spis treści książki

• Preface
  • Conventions Used in This Book
  • OReilly Online Learning
  • How to Contact Us
  • Acknowledgments
• Introduction: Birth of Chaos
  • Management Principles as Code
  • Chaos Monkey Is Born
  • Going Big
  • Formalizing the Discipline
  • Community Is Born
  • Fast Evolution
• I. Setting the Stage
• 1. Encountering Complex Systems
  • Contemplating Complexity
  • Encountering Complexity
    • Example 1: Mismatch Between Business Logic and Application Logic
    • Example 2: Customer-Induced Retry Storm
    • Example 3: Holiday Code Freeze
  • Confronting Complexity
    • Accidental Complexity
    • Essential Complexity
  • Embracing Complexity
• 2. Navigating Complex Systems
  • Dynamic Safety Model
    • Economics
    • Workload
    • Safety
  • Economic Pillars of Complexity
    • State
    • Relationships
    • Environment
    • Reversibility
    • Economic Pillars of Complexity Applied to Software
  • The Systemic Perspective
• 3. Overview of Principles
  • What Chaos Engineering Is
    • Experimentation Versus Testing
    • Verification Versus Validation
  • What Chaos Engineering Is Not
    • Breaking Stuff
    • Antifragility
  • Advanced Principles
    • Build a Hypothesis Around Steady-State Behavior
    • Vary Real-World Events
    • Run Experiments in Production
    • Automate Experiments to Run Continuously
    • Minimize Blast Radius
  • The Future of The Principles
• II. Principles in Action
• 4. Slacks Disasterpiece Theater
  • Retrofitting Chaos
    • Design Patterns Common in Older Systems
    • Design Patterns Common in Newer Systems
    • Getting to Basic Fault Tolerance
  • Disasterpiece Theater
    • Goals
    • Anti-Goals
  • The Process
    • Preparation
    • The Exercise
    • Debriefing
  • How the Process Has Evolved
  • Getting Management Buy-In
  • Results
    • Avoid Cache Inconsistency
    • Try, Try Again (for Safety)
    • Impossibility Result
  • Conclusion
• 5. Google DiRT: Disaster Recovery Testing
  • Life of a DiRT Test
    • The Rules of Engagement
      • DiRT tests must have no service-level objective breaking impact on external systems or users
      • Production emergencies always take precedence over DiRT emergencies
      • Run DiRT tests with transparency
      • Minimize cost, maximize value
      • Treat disaster tests as you would actual outages
    • What to Test
      • Run at service levels
      • Run without dependencies
      • People outages
      • Release and rollback
      • Incident management procedures
      • Datacenter operations
      • Capacity management
      • Business continuity plans
      • Data integrity
      • Networks
      • Monitoring and alerting
      • Telecommunications and IT systems
      • Medical and security emergencies
      • Reboot everything
    • How to Test
    • Gathering Results
  • Scope of Tests at Google
  • Conclusion
• 6. Microsoft Variation and Prioritization of Experiments
  • Why Is Everything So Complicated?
    • An Example of Unexpected Complications
    • A Simple System Is the Tip of the Iceberg
  • Categories of Experiment Outcomes
    • Known Events/Unexpected Consequences
    • Unknown Events/Unexpected Consequences
  • Prioritization of Failures
    • Explore Dependencies
  • Degree of Variation
    • Varying Failures
    • Combining Variation and Prioritization
    • Expanding Variation to Dependencies
  • Deploying Experiments at Scale
  • Conclusion
• 7. LinkedIn Being Mindful of Members
  • Learning from Disaster
  • Granularly Targeting Experiments
  • Experimenting at Scale, Safely
  • In Practice: LinkedOut
    • Failure Modes
    • Using LiX to Target Experiments
    • Browser Extension for Rapid Experimentation
    • Automated Experimentation
  • Conclusion
• 8. Capital One Adoption and Evolution of Chaos Engineering
  • A Capital One Case Study
    • Blind Resiliency Testing
    • Transition to Chaos Engineering
    • Chaos Experiments in CI/CD
  • Things to Watch Out for While Designing the Experiment
  • Tooling
  • Team Structure
  • Evangelism
  • Conclusion
• III. Human Factors
• 9. Creating Foresight
  • Chaos Engineering and Resilience
  • Steps of the Chaos Engineering Cycle
    • Designing the Experiment
  • Tool Support for Chaos Experiment Design
  • Effectively Partnering Internally
    • Understand Operating Procedures
    • Discuss Scope
    • Hypothesize
  • Conclusion
• 10. Humanistic Chaos
  • Humans in the System
    • Putting the Socio in Sociotechnical Systems
    • Organizations Are a System of Systems
  • Engineering Adaptive Capacity
    • Spotting Weak Signals
    • Failure and Success, Two Sides of the Same Coin
  • Putting the Principles into Practice
    • Build a Hypothesis
    • Vary Real-World Events
    • Minimize the Blast Radius
    • Case Study 1: Gaming Your Game Days
      • The hypothesis
      • The variable
      • The outcome
    • Communication: The Network Latency of Any Organization
      • Pave new pathways to communication
    • Case Study 2: Connecting the Dots
      • The hypothesis
      • The variable
      • The outcome
    • Leadership Is an Emergent Property of the System
      • Moving your organization forward
      • Using signals to set a direction
    • Case Study 3: Changing a Basic Assumption
      • The hypothesis
      • The variable
      • The outcome
    • Safely Organizing the Chaos
    • All You Need Is Altitude and a Direction
    • Close the Loops
    • If Youre Not Failing, Youre Not Learning
• 11. People in the Loop
  • The Why, How, and When of Experiments
    • The Why
    • The How
    • The When
      • During incidents: Is this related to what youre running?
      • But what about automation and getting people out of the loop?
    • Functional Allocation, or Humans-Are-Better-At/Machines-Are-Better-At
    • The Substitution Myth
  • Conclusion
• 12. The Experiment Selection Problem (and a Solution)
  • Choosing Experiments
    • Random Search
    • The Age of the Experts
      • The role of the expert
  • Observability: The Opportunity
    • Observability for Intuition Engineering
      • Lineage-driven fault injection
  • Conclusion
• IV. Business Factors
• 13. ROI of Chaos Engineering
  • Ephemeral Nature of Incident Reduction
  • Kirkpatrick Model
    • Level 1: Reaction
    • Level 2: Learning
    • Level 3: Transfer
    • Level 4: Results
  • Alternative ROI Example
  • Collateral ROI
  • Conclusion
• 14. Open Minds, Open Science, and Open Chaos
  • Collaborative Mindsets
  • Open Science; Open Source
    • Open Chaos Experiments
    • Experiment Findings, Shareable Results
  • Conclusion
• 15. Chaos Maturity Model
  • Adoption
    • Who Bought into Chaos Engineering
    • How Much of the Organization Participates in Chaos Engineering
    • Prerequisites
    • Obstacles to Adoption
    • Sophistication
      • Game Days
      • Fault injection consultation
      • Fault injection self-service tools
      • Experimentation platforms
      • Automation of the platforms
  • Putting It All Together
• V. Evolution
• 16. Continuous Verification
  • Where CV Comes From
  • Types of CV Systems
  • CV in the Wild: ChAP
    • ChAP: Selecting Experiments
    • ChAP: Running Experiments
    • The Advanced Principles in ChAP
    • ChAP as Continuous Verification
  • CV Coming Soon to a System Near You
    • Performance Testing
    • Data Artifacts
    • Correctness
• 17. Lets Get Cyber-Physical
  • The Rise of Cyber-Physical Systems
  • Functional Safety Meets Chaos Engineering
    • FMEA and Chaos Engineering
  • Software in Cyber-Physical Systems
  • Chaos Engineering as a Step Beyond FMEA
  • Probe Effect
    • Addressing the Probe Effect
  • Conclusion
• 18. HOP Meets Chaos Engineering
  • What Is Human and Organizational Performance (HOP)?
  • Key Principles of HOP
    • Principle 1: Error Is Normal
    • Principle 2: Blame Fixes Nothing
    • Principle 3: Context Drives Behavior
    • Principle 4: Learning and Improving Is Vital
    • Principle 5: Intentional Response Matters
  • HOP Meets Chaos Engineering
    • Chaos Engineering and HOP in Practice
  • Conclusion
• 19. Chaos Engineering on a Database
  • Why Do We Need Chaos Engineering?
    • Robustness and Stability
    • A Real-World Example
  • Applying Chaos Engineering
    • Our Way of Embracing Chaos
    • Fault Injection
    • Fault Injection in Applications
    • Fault Injection in CPU and Memory
    • Fault Injection in the Network
    • Fault Injection in the Filesystem
  • Detecting Failures
  • Automating Chaos
    • Automated Experimentation Platform: Schrodinger
    • Schrodinger Workflow
  • Conclusion
• 20. The Case for Security Chaos Engineering
  • A Modern Approach to Security
    • Human Factors and Failure
    • Remove the Low-Hanging Fruit
    • Feedback Loops
  • Security Chaos Engineering and Current Methods
    • Problems with Red Teaming
    • Problems with Purple Teaming
    • Benefits of Security Chaos Engineering
  • Security Game Days
  • Example Security Chaos Engineering Tool: ChaoSlingr
    • The Story of ChaoSlingr
  • Conclusion
  • Contributors/Reviewers
• 21. Conclusion
• Index

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