The Choice of the Bargaining Agenda in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

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Cover

Title

Colofon

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1. The collective bargaining level in advanced economies

1. Introduction

2. Overview 

2.1. Methodology

2.2. Structure

Chapter 2. The union-firm bargaining agenda selection in monopoly

1. Introduction

2. Bargaining models: Right-to-Manage and Efficient Bargaining

2.1. Preliminary considerations

2.2. The Right-to-Manage model

2.3. The Efficient Bargaining model

3. Extensions

3.1. Network industries

3.2. Managerial delegation

3.3. Public/private monopoly

4. Conclusions

Chapter 3. The choice of the bargaining agenda in a duopoly: the basic framework and some extensions

1. Introduction

2. The basic model

3. A unionised labour market

3.1. The Right-to-Manage institution

3.2. The Efficient Bargaining institution

3.3. Mixed case: one bargaining unit chooses Efficient Bargaining and the other chooses Right-to-Manage

4. Equilibrium agendas

4.1. A game with simultaneous Efficient Bargaining and mixed case 1

4.2. A game with simultaneous Efficient Bargaining and mixed case 2

4.3. Discussion of the outcomes of two timings of the bargaining agenda game

5. Extensions

5.1. Different degrees of market competition: a conjectural variation model

5.2. Unions have distinct preferences: a more general union utility function

5.3. Network industries

6. Conclusions

Chapter 4. Concluding remarks

Bibliography

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